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Abstract 
 
In the absence of a federal policy to cap carbon emissions many states are moving 
forward with their own initiatives, which currently range from announcements of 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gases to a regional multi-state cap-and-trade 
program slated to begin in 2009.  While federal legislation is expected in the next few 
years, it is unclear how such legislation will define the relationship between a federal cap 
and trade program and other state regulations.  Assuming the introduction of a cap-and-
trade program at the federal level, this paper analyzes the economic and environmental 
impacts of the range of possible interactions between the federal program and state 
programs.  We find that the impacts of interaction depend on relative stringency of the 
federal and state program and overlap in source coverage.  Where state programs are 
both duplicative of and more demanding than  the federal cap, the effect is entirely 
redistributive of costs and emissions, with in-state sources facing higher marginal 
abatement costs. Also, differing marginal abatement costs among states create economic 
inefficiencies that make achievement of the climate goal more costly than it need be.  
These redistributive effects and the associated economic inefficiency are avoided under 
either federal preemption of duplicative state programs or a ‘carve out’ of state 
programs from the federal cap with linkage to the federal allowance market.      
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I. Introduction 
  
 In the absence of a federal policy to cap greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions many 
states are moving forward with their own initiatives to reduce these emissions.  These 
initiatives vary greatly in both their range of development and the extent to which they 
actually mandate emission reductions.   For example, some of these initiatives take the 
form of official GHG emission reduction targets, but for which no specific legislative or 
regulatory requirements have been enacted.  Others, however, are more specific and will 
impose emission reduction requirements through regional cap-and-trade programs, 
emission rate limits for power plants located within the state, or renewable electricity 
generation and end-use energy efficiency requirements.   While federal legislation – most 
likely in the form of a national cap-and-trade program – is expected in the near future, it 
is unclear how such legislation will define the relationship between a federal program and 
existing state programs, particularly when state programs involve cap-and-trade. Absent 
federal legislation, questions remain as to how EPA might cap GHG emissions under the 
existing Clean Air Act.1, 2  While the interactions between state and federal programs will 
have important implications for the economic and environmental impacts of climate 
policy in the U.S., research has provided very limited treatment of this point. Further, the 
treatment of state programs under a federal cap-and-trade bill appears likely to be a point 
of contention as federal climate legislation moves forward. While a bill passed out of the 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in December 2007 explicitly retains 
state authority to enact GHG reduction requirements that are at least as stringent as the 
federal requirement, the bill being formulated in the House committee with primary 
jurisdiction is expected to include federal preemption of comparable state programs.3 
 
In light of this debate, this paper analyzes the economic and environmental 
impacts of the range of possible relationships between federal and state climate policies, 
focusing on both aggregate and distributional outcomes.  It assumes the introduction of a 
“simple” cap-and-trade program at the federal level, and considers both cap-and-trade 
and other regulatory programs at the state level.4  Two attributes drive the impacts of 
interaction between the federal and state programs: 1) the relative stringency of the state 
and federal programs and 2) the overlap, or the extent to which the federal and state 
programs cover the same sources. Other design features, such as the allocation method, 
offsets, or safety valves, may change the economic and environmental effects but they do 
not alter the basic interaction when the two programs co-exist.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses existing precedents for the 
interaction between federal cap-and-trade programs and state policies.  Section III 
characterizes the major types of existing state efforts to address climate change, 
highlighting specific examples of state programs.  Sections IV and V analyze the 
                                                 
1 42 USC 7401.  Also available online: http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/. 
2 Point Carbon. 2008. US to have “tough time” regulating carbon without climate bill: EPA.  April  3. 
3 Point Carbon. 2008. US legislators to disagree over federal preemption for cap and trade.  January 23.   
4 Although federal climate legislation might include more than a cap-and-trade program, we ignore those 
other possibilities in this paper and focus on the interaction between a “simple” federal cap-and-trade 
program, unencumbered by other federal mandates, and state programs that could include cap-and-trade as 
well as other regulatory measures affecting sources covered by the federal program.  
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economic impacts of the coexistence of a federal cap-and-trade program with state cap-
and-trade programs and other state regulations, respectively.  Section VI considers the 
impacts of two other potential relationships between federal and state cap-and-trade 
programs: federal preemption, and what we call a ‘carve-out,’ where a state-cap-and-
trade program exists separately from and substitutes for the federal program.  Finally, 
Section VII concludes and puts forth some additional considerations for policymakers.   
 
II.  Policy and Legal Precedents for State and Federal Climate Policy Interactions 
 
 Discussion of the potential federal-state relationship in U.S. climate policy can be 
informed by treatment of federal-state relations under existing statutes relevant to 
emissions control, as well as legal doctrine that addresses this relationship.  First, under 
the Clean Air Act, states retain the authority to impose emission control requirements on 
stationary sources that are additional to what may be required by federal legislation or 
regulation.  Three cap-and-trade programs under the Act – the Acid Rain Program for 
SO2 emissions, the NOx Budget Trading Program, and the recently vacated Clean Air 
Mercury Rule – provide distinct examples of how federal and state governments might 
interact in the context of a national cap on GHG emissions.  Second, with respect to 
mobile sources, the Clean Air Act provides an example of statutory preemption of state 
vehicle emission standards that are more stringent than federal regulations, though it 
provides special consideration for California. Likewise, the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA), which established the Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) program, expressly prohibits state regulation of vehicle fuel economy where 
federal requirements exist.5 Finally, potential restrictions on state authority to implement 
GHG regulations that could arise from a number of potential legal hurdles may have 
indirect implications for the interaction of state and federal climate programs.  
 
First, the Acid Rain Program provides an example of federal legislation 
establishing a new cap-and-trade program without federal preemption of state regulation 
of emissions that contribute to acid rain. This program, established by Title IV of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 19906, imposes a nationwide cap on SO2 emissions from 
the power sector.7  The statute provides for direct regulation of sources by the EPA and 
codifies source-level allowance allocations.  While Title IV sets a minimum level of 
control of electricity sector SO2 emissions, it does not preempt state authority to impose 
more stringent controls on these emissions.8  Prior to the start of the federal program on 
January 1, 1995, several states, notably, Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin, had 
already implemented state programs that imposed specific emission rate limits on SO2 
                                                 
5 See 49 USC § 32919(a) 
6 42 USC 7651 
7 Title IV also sets NOx emissions rate requirements for affected sources and allows “averaging” or trading 
among sources under common ownership.   
8 This precedent is arguably more germane to climate legislation in that the justification concerns a problem 
that transcends state boundaries in contrast to the local attainment of the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for SO2 and for particulate matter of which SO2 is a precursor. The latter are primarily 
within-state concerns for which the Clean Air Act grants states the authority to impose controls of whatever 
stringency required to meet the national NAAQS.  
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emissions that contribute to acid rain, and those programs continued in force after the 
federal program went into effect.  
 
EPA’s second stationary-source cap-and-trade program, the NOx Budget Trading 
Program, provides a different model in that it was established under the Agency’s 
existing regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act instead of by specific congressional 
legislation.  This program started as a regional program implemented, with the 
cooperation of the federal EPA, by the nine member states of the Ozone Transport 
Commission (OTC), an interstate compact authorized by the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990 to facilitate the adoption of interstate measures to address attainment of the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ozone in the Northeastern U.S.. 
The OTC adopted a three-phase program that consisted of an initial uniform annual NOx 
emission limit requiring Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) beginning in 
1995. This first phase was followed by a progressively more demanding two-phase 
regional cap-and-trade program that applied to NOx emissions during the May to 
September ozone season and which began in 1999 and 2003.  In 1998, EPA exercised its 
existing authority under the Clean Air Act in response to a tightening of the ozone 
NAAQS to issue the “NOx SIP Call,”9 a rulemaking that expanded the OTC cap-and-
trade program to include 19 states and the District of Columbia effective in 2003. 10 More 
recently, EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR),11 which becomes effective in 2009, 
followed this precedent in expanding the program to 28 states and adding an annual cap 
on NOx emissions while maintaining the ozone season cap.12   
 
 Both the NOx SIP Call and CAIR use EPA’s existing regulatory authority under 
sections 110 and 126 of the Clean Air Act to assign states NOX emission budgets, which 
are effectively state-level caps, and to require them to submit State Implementation Plans 
(SIPs) laying out the state rules that would achieve the emission reductions required by 
their respective budgets.13  In what was a radical innovation, the NOx SIP Call also 
provided states the option of achieving their state budgets by joining an EPA-
administered cap-and-trade program for NOx, an approach continued in CAIR. While all 
affected states under both the NOx SIP call and CAIR have chosen to participate in the 
NOx Budget Trading Program, participation in the program was voluntary.  An affected 
state could opt to achieve its NOx budget by implementing conventional prescriptive 
regulations that would exist separately from the federal trading program.  Finally, under 
the NOX SIP Call and CAIR, states retain the authority granted by the Clean Air Act to 
implement requirements more stringent than federal requirements.  
 
                                                 
9 63 FR 57356 
10 The pre-existing OTC program was folded into this more geographically extensive cap-and-trade 
program, which was of equivalent stringency to the final 2003 OTC program, and which became the NOx 
Budget Program.   
11 70 FR 25162 
12 CAIR also increases the allowance retirement ratio for sources under the Acid Rain Program, in order to 
promote additional SO2 reductions and compliance with the NAAQS for PM 2.5.   
13 The basic structure of the Clean Air Act requires states to submit and to obtain EPA approval of State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs) that specify how within-state emissions will be controlled to a level that will 
ensure attainment of the NAAQS for criteria pollutants specified in the Clean Air Act.    
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 Third, EPA’s recently vacated Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) relied upon a 
regulatory framework to establish a cap-and-trade program under section 111(d) of the 
Clean Air Act that is analogous to that used for the NOx Budget Trading Program.14  
Under CAMR, however, states that opposed using cap-and-trade to control mercury 
emissions or which wished to implement targets more stringent than those put forth by 
the federal program could and did opt-out and adopt equivalent or more stringent 
programs that would have remained separate from the federal cap-and-trade program. In 
addition, states wishing to participate in the federal program but withhold some portion of 
their state budget, effectively lowering the federal cap, had the option to do so.15  
Nordhaus (2007) has suggested that the regulatory authority used to promulgate the Clean 
Air Mercury Rule could provide the most promising vehicle for establishing a GHG cap 
for stationary sources under the Clean Air Act.16 
  
 While the Clean Air Act generally preserves state authority to regulate emissions 
from stationary sources to levels more stringent than required by federal rules, it 
explicitly limits state authority to do so in the transportation sector in order to avoid 
exposing vehicle manufacturers to an array of varying state standards.  Because it 
preceded the federal government in regulating vehicle emissions for pollution control 
purposes, California is allowed, under section 209(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, to petition 
the Environmental Protection Agency for a waiver allowing the state to implement motor 
vehicle emission standards that are more stringent than those at the federal level.  Other 
states are permitted to adopt California’s standards under section 177 of the Act, but are 
precluded from developing a different state standard.   In contrast to conventionally 
regulated emissions, such as particulates, reduction of a vehicle’s GHG emission rate 
implies an improvement in fuel economy.  As a result, the line between these vehicle 
emissions standards and fuel economy standards is blurred. 17  For this reason, vehicle 
manufacturers have argued – thus far unsuccessfully – that state GHG emissions 
standards for vehicles are not allowed under section 32919(a) of EPCA,18 which 
preempts states from setting regulations “related to” fuel economy standards for vehicles 
covered by fuel economy standards under the Act.19    
 
 Finally, while express preemption or retention of state authority in a federal 
statute, such as discussed above in the context of the Clean Air Act, would provide the 
                                                 
14 70 FR 28606. The rule was vacated on the grounds that EPA did not present sufficient analysis to justify 
delisting mercury, a toxic air pollutant, from the list of pollutants that the Agency must regulate from 
electricity generating units using a maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standard under 
Section 112 of the CAA.  (State of New Jersey et al. v. EPA No. 05-1097 (DC Cir.Feb. 8, 2008)).  
15 In response to state requests to do so, EPA released a statement noting that this approach was permissible 
under the rule, but cautioning states to consider cost, feasibility, and uncertainty before permanently 
retiring allowances.  See: US EPA.  “CAMR Frequent Questions.”  Online: 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/camr/faq-camr.html.   
16 See Nordhaus, Robert.  2007. “New Wine into Old Bottles: The Feasibility of Greenhouse Gas 
Regulation under the Clean Air Act.” New York University Environmental Law Journal. 15 (53-72). 
17 To clarify this distinction, motor vehicle emission standards are specified as grams of pollutant emitted 
per mile, and fuel economy standards are specified in terms of miles achieved per gallon of fuel.   
18 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, No. 05-00302 (D. VT, September 12, 2007; 
and Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone  No. CV F 04-6663 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 12, 2007).   
19 See 49 USC § 32919(a).   
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greatest certainty in terms of the interaction between federal and state climate programs, 
existing legal doctrine could result in federal preemption of state programs on other 
grounds.  In interpreting the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, courts have held that 
a state rule is preempted if a federal law is deemed sufficiently comprehensive so as to 
imply preemption, or if the state rule is found to conflict with or frustrate implementation 
of the federal law.20  In addition, while not specifically questions of preemption, state 
climate programs could face additional legal challenges to their validity.21  First, state or 
regional climate policies could be found to be in violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause to the extent that they are held to discriminate against or to excessively burden 
interstate commerce.  Efforts that attempt to reduce the leakage of emissions from state or 
regional programs to sources outside of the covered region may be at the greatest risk of 
such a violation.22   Second, climate programs constructed as regional agreements could 
face legal challenges under the Interstate Compact Clause, which prohibits interstate 
agreements absent congressional consent.  
 
 
III.   Overview of Existing State Climate Regulation and Proposed Federal 
Legislation 
 
 The economic and environmental implications of how state and federal programs 
interact will depend on the specific actions taken at these different levels of government. 
Inventories of state climate actions are maintained by a number of organizations.23  This 
section provides an overview of the type of state actions that have been taken to date, 
emphasizing the development of regulatory requirements and the specific design 
elements within certain state regulations.  As Section IV will demonstrate, an 
understanding of design elements is particularly important where state programs 
implement cap-and-trade. 
 
This section begins with a discussion of the four significant policy developments 
in regional and state-level emissions trading: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), the Midwest Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Accord, and California’s Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32). Second, it provides an 
overview of other state regulatory requirements that directly affect emissions sources, 
such as power plant performance standards and AB 1493, California’s vehicle emission 
standard.  It then provides an overview of state renewable portfolio standards (RPS), 
                                                 
20 Pidot. Justin R. 2006. “Global Warming in the Courts: An Overview of Current Litigation and Common 
Legal Issues.” Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute, Georgetown University Law Center.  
21 For brief discussions of the legal hurdles faced by state and local climate policies see: Wiener, J.B. 2007. 
“Think Locally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies.” Duke Law School Working Paper 
Series, Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 93 (May 2007) and Huffman, Robert K. and Jonathan Weisgall, 
“Climate Change and the States: Constitutional Issues Arising from State Climate Protection Leadership,” 
available at: http://links.cecollect.com/208/4292/Huffman%20&%20Weisgall.pdf. 
22 This is because in order to prevent emission leakage, a state may have to implement measures that will 
remove the cost advantage provided to sources outside of the cap, effectively making output from these 
out-of-state sources more costly.     
23 See, for example, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/, and US EPA 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/stateandlocalgov/index.html.   
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energy efficiency resource standards, and demand side measures that may affect state 
GHG emissions.   Finally, it provides an overview of the two most prominent federal bills 
that would establish a federal cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions. 
 
III-1. Overview of Regional and State Emissions Trading Initiatives 
 
 Of the four major efforts among states to develop cap-and-trade programs for 
reducing GHG emissions, RGGI is by far the most developed, with the initial phase of 
the program scheduled to start on January 1, 2009.  Emulating the RGGI process, states 
in the WCI and Midwest Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord have embarked 
upon the initial stages of deciding caps and developing a model rule for their respective 
regional cap-and-trade programs.  Finally, while California is a participant in the WCI, it 
provides an example of a single state’s effort to move forward with development of a 
cap-and-trade program through the state’s requirements under AB 32. 
 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
 
RGGI is the result of a process involving stakeholders and state regulatory staff 
that was initiated by the governors of a number of Northeastern states in 2003. This 
process resulted in the issuance of a Memorandum of Understanding (RGGI MOU), 
which was originally signed by seven state governors in December 2005, and now 
includes ten signatory states in the Northeast.24  It establishes a cap-and-trade program for 
CO2 emissions from the power sector in these states, implementing an annual cap that 
stabilizes emissions at current levels over the years 2009-2014, and declines by 2.5% 
annually between 2014 and 2018.  States participating in RGGI and their state CO2 
budgets for the years 2009 and 2018 are shown in Table III-1.  
 
Table III-1.  CO2 Emissions Budgets for RGGI States, 2009 and 2018 
State 2009 Budget (short tons) 2018 Budget (short tons) 
CT 10,695, 036 9,625,532 
DE 7,559,787 6,803,808 
ME 5,948,902 5,354,012 
MD 37,503,983 33,753,585 
MA 26,660,204 23,994,184 
NH 8,620,460 7,758,414 
NJ 22,892,730 20,603,457 
NY 64,310,805 57,879,725 
RI 2,659,239 2,393,315 
VT 1,225,830 1,103,247 
Total 177,381,940 169,269,279 
                   Source: RGGI MOU and individual state rules. 
 
                                                 
24 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  “Memorandum of Understanding.”  December 20, 2005.  Available 
online: http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf.  The RGGI states include CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, 
NH NY, NJ, RI,, and VT.  Although Massachusetts and Rhode Island participated in the RGGI process, 
their governors did not sign the original MOU, but they have since done so, as has Maryland. 
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Because the regional agreement must be implemented under the authority of each 
individual state, the RGGI stakeholder process released a model rule in August, 2006, 
which RGGI states are currently using as a basis for drafting and promulgating their 
individual regulations.25  Key provisions of the RGGI model rule are presented in Table 
III-2.  Two areas of the model rule provide for individual state discretion.  The first is the 
option to exempt sources whose output to the grid is restricted by permitting conditions.  
The second is allowance allocation, where the model rule requires only that at least 25% 
of allowances be allocated for a “consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose.”26 
 
Table III-2.  Overview of Key Design Elements in the RGGI Model Rule 
Design Element Approach taken in RGGI 
Applicability Existing (operational before 1/1/05) electricity 
generating units ≥ 25 MW with >50% of heat input from 
fossil fuels. 
New electricity generating units ≥ 25 MW with > 5% of 
heat input from fossil fuels. 
States can choose to exempt units that sell less than 10% 
of their electricity output to the grid.   
Length of compliance period 3 years, extended to 4 if offset price exceeds $10 
threshold. 
Allowance allocation At states’ discretion, though at least 25% must be to 
‘consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose.’  
Allowable offsets  Landfill methane capture and destruction; sulfur 
hexafluoride emissions reductions; afforestation; 
avoided CO2 emissions from natural gas, oil, or propane 
through energy efficiency; and avoided agricultural 
methane emissions 
Offset use Limited to 3.3% of total compliance allowances; 
increased to 5% if allowance price exceeds $7 per ton, 
and 10% if allowance price exceeds $10 per ton, for the 
duration of the compliance period.a 
Banking Unlimited 
Borrowing None 
Safety valve Provided via relaxation of offset limit 
Early Reduction Credits May be awarded for reductions occurring in 2006, 2007, 
and 2008  
a. Prices are adjusted annually for inflation.  
 
                                                 
25 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. “Model Rule – 1/5/07 final with corrections.”  Online: 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf.  
26 Examples of such purposes are the promotion of energy efficiency, the direct mitigation of electricity 
ratepayer impacts, promotion of renewable or non-carbon-emitting energy technologies, the stimulation and 
rewarding of investment in developing innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies, and 
administration of the program. See Ibid., page 44. 
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The cap-and-trade program under RGGI is scheduled to begin on January 1, 2009.  
The first auction of RGGI allowances is currently planned for September 2008.27   
Accordingly, RGGI states are moving forward with the development of legislation and 
regulation that will allow them to implement the program.  Currently, only Massachusetts 
and Maine have finalized the necessary legislation and regulations to implement a CO2 
trading program under RGGI, with other RGGI states at varied levels of completion of 
their own processes.28  The significant deviation from the model rule that has emerged in 
proposed legislation and regulation is the intention of RGGI states to auction close to 100 
percent of state emission allowances, with some reserving small set-asides for combined 
heat and power (CHP) facilities, allowance retirement for voluntary renewable energy 
purchases, or other policy goals.29   
 
Finally, the RGGI MOU, while not legally enforceable, does express the RGGI 
member states’ intent with respect to interaction with a federal cap-and-trade program.  
The MOU notes that RGGI states will “advocate for a federal program that rewards states 
that are first movers.”30  In addition, the MOU notes that RGGI states will “transition 
into” a federal program that is deemed “comparable” to RGGI, though the mechanism for 
doing so is not described.31  However, among RGGI state rulemakings there are two 
examples of states withdrawing existing state rules in order to eliminate overlapping 
requirements on state sources subject to RGGI.  Massachusetts, in its RGGI regulation, 
and New Hampshire, in its proposed legislation, include provisions that would allow 
RGGI to supersede their respective existing state regulations for CO2 emissions from the 
power sector.      
 
Western Climate Initiative 
 
 The governors of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington 
established the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) in February 2007.32  Utah, Montana and 
the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba and Quebec have since joined the 
initiative.33  Participating states and provinces have set a collective GHG emissions goal 
in August 2007 of 15% below 2005 levels by 2020.  This goal represents an aggregate 
reduction that was calculated based on the individual GHG emission targets of 
participating states and provinces.   WCI participants are scheduled to complete 
                                                 
27 Point Carbon.  2008.  “First RGGI Auction Moved to 10 September.” March 17, 2008.  
28 In the RGGI MOU, the governors of the Signatory States committed “to seek to establish in statute 
and/or regulation” their respective components of the regional program as soon as practicable but not later 
than 12/31/2008 so that the program can launch on the intended start date of 1/1/2009. Accordingly, there 
are no penalties for failure to establish a particular state’s component of the regional program and Maine’s 
legislation is explicitly conditioned on the participation of a sufficient number of other RGGI states.  
29 To date, only Delaware has not completed a legislative or regulatory proposal indicating the share of 
allowances to be auctioned.  The Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control 
has recommended that the state auction 60 percent of the state’s allowances.  Point Carbon. 2008. Delaware 
to introduce RGGI legislation. May 5.    
30 See RGGI, supra note 24. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/.  
33 Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, and Wyoming, are participating as observers, as are the 
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Saskatchewan, and six Mexican states.   
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recommendations for the design of a regional cap-and-trade program, including 
consideration of multiple sector participation and coverage of multiple GHGs, by August, 
2008.  The governors’ agreement does not comment on how programs under the WCI 
should relate to an eventual federal cap 
 
Midwest Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord 
 
 On November 15, 2007, governors from the six Midwestern states of Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas, as well as the premier of the Canadian 
province of Manitoba signed an accord agreeing to develop regional GHG emission 
reduction targets and a multi-sector cap-and-trade program to enable the achievement of 
these targets.34  Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota are participating in the process as 
observers.  Participants have agreed to develop GHG reduction targets and timelines 
consistent with their individual jurisdictional goals within eight months of the date of the 
accord.  Further, participants intend to propose a cap-and-trade program and to complete 
a model rule within twelve months of the date of the accord, that is, by November 2008.  
Finally, the accord specifies that the resulting cap-and-trade program should address 
interaction or integration with an eventual federal program.   
 
Assembly Bill 32 
 
 AB 32 was signed into law in California on September 27, 2006.35  It requires that 
California’s GHG emissions be reduced to 1990 levels by 2020, through regulations 
developed by the California Air Resources Board (CARB).  In compliance with AB 32, 
on December 6, 2007, CARB approved a GHG emissions inventory for 1990 and a 2020 
emissions limit of 427 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent. 36     
 
 AB 32 requires that CARB adopt regulations by January 1, 2011, to achieve the 
2020 target and notes that these regulations may include market-based mechanisms and 
declining emissions caps.37  CARB is currently in the process of developing a scoping 
plan to evaluate policy options and make recommendations, a process that AB 32 
requires be completed by January 1, 2009.  While a cap-and-trade program is expected to 
be the primary regulation driving emissions reductions in California, the form that such a 
program will take remains uncertain. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) 
and the California Energy Commission (CEC) have jointly recommended a cap-and-trade 
program for electricity generators that would place the regulatory obligation to surrender 
allowances on the deliverer of power to the California grid.38 The term “deliverer” is used 
instead of the emitting source, as is usual in cap-and-trade programs, in an attempt to 
prevent emissions leakage by including emissions embodied in imported power under the 
cap. However, opponents of such a system, which include investor-owned utilities, argue 
                                                 
34 See http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf.  
35 The text of AB 32 is available online: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/ab32text.pdf. 
36 See http://www.arb.ca.gov/board/ms/2007/ms120607.pdf.  
37 Ibid., see section 38562(c). 
38 California Public Utilities Commission. 2008. Interim Opinion on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory 
Strategies. March 13, 2008.  Online: 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/AGENDA_DECISION/80074.htm.  
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that it would complicate emissions accounting, be vulnerable to manipulation by load-
serving entities, and be complicated to integrate with other federal or regional programs, 
which would likely be entirely source-based.39  
 
III-2. State Regulation of Emissions Sources 
 
 A number of states have adopted legislation or regulation imposing direct 
emission requirements, thus far targeting power plants and vehicles.  Power plant 
standards include emission caps, emission rate requirements, and sequestration 
requirements for new facilities.  State vehicle standards are based on the California’s AB 
1493, the implementation of which remains uncertain, subject to resolution of litigation at 
the Federal level.   
 
Power Sector 
 
Six states have existing legislation or regulations that impose restrictions on 
power plant emissions of CO2.  These requirements vary significantly in the extent of 
their applicability and chosen regulatory instrument.  They are summarized below in 
Table III-3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
39 Point Carbon. 2007. California power companies split over cap-and-trade design.  December 18, 2007.   
  
 12
 
Table III-3. Summary of State GHG Emissions Requirements for Power Plants 
State Type of Standard Major Provisions Comments 
CA Emissions 
performance 
standard (SB 1368, 
2006) 
Prohibits new long-term (more than 5 
years) financial commitments for, or 
new ownership interests in, baseload 
generation with plants that exceed 
1100 lbs/megawatt-hour (MWh) of 
CO2.  Does not allow for offsets.   
Requires CPUC and 
CEC to reevaluate 
standard when 
enforceable cap is 
established. 
MA Emissions cap and 
standard.  
(310 CMR 7.29, 
2001) 
Affected facilities to meet annual CO2 
emissions cap standards beginning 
January 1, 2006, and an annual CO2 
rate standard of 1,800 pounds CO2 
/MWh beginning January 1, 2008.  
Off-site reductions permissible.  
To be superseded by 
RGGI beginning 
January 1, 2009. 
MT Technology 
standard and offset 
requirement (HB 
25, 2007) 
Prohibits state PUC from approving 
coal-fired electricity generating units 
(EGUs) after January 1, 2007 unless 
at least 50% of CO2 is captured and 
sequestered.  Also requires “cost-
effective” offsets for new (post 
1/1/07) gas/syngas units. 
 
NH Emissions cap on 
public utility 
(HB 284, 2002; 
Env-A-2900) 
Cap achieves 1990 levels by 2006.  
Affects 6 fossil-fuel fired EGUs.  
Trading, banking.  
Pending legislation 
would replace standard 
with RGGI. 
OR Emissions standard 
for new power 
plants. (Division 
24, OAR 345-024-
0500, 1997) 
New baseload and non-baseload 
EGUs must meet rate standard of 
0.675 lbs CO2/KWh.  Compliance can 
be through offset purchase.   
 
WA GHG Mitigation 
Rule (WAC Ch. 
173-407, 2004)  
New plants and existing plants 
increasing emissions by >15% must 
develop CO2 mitigation plan to offset 
20% of emissions over 30 years. 
 
WA Emissions 
performance 
standard (Substitute 
Senate Bill 6001, 
2007).   
Beginning July 1, 2008, requires all 
new long-term financial commitments 
for baseload generation be with plants 
that do not exceed 1100 lbs/MWh of 
CO2.  Verifiable emissions reductions 
allowed if sequestration plan cannot 
be implemented. 
 
Source: Pew Center on Global Climate Change and individual state rules. 
 
Transportation Sector 
 
California has attempted to utilize its waiver provision under section 209 of the 
CAA in order to implement AB 1493, the Clean Car Law, which was signed into law in 
July 2002, and followed by standard-setting regulations in December 2004.  The 
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regulations under this law, implement declining CO2-equivalent emission rate standards 
for new passenger cars and light duty trucks beginning in 2009.  The rates are calculated 
on a fleet average, and allow for the banking and trading of emission rate reduction 
credits.  These rules are projected to result in a 22% reduction in GHG emissions from 
new cars by 2012 relative to the 2002 fleet, and a 30% reduction by 2016.40 
 
While California and sixteen other states have moved forward with statutory and 
regulatory processes to implement Clean Car laws41, their legal authority to do so remains 
uncertain.  The rules were challenged by the automobile industry in federal courts in 
Vermont and California partly on the grounds that, even if a waiver is granted to 
California by EPA, they would be preempted under EPCA.42  While the courts held that 
this is not the case, these rulings are being appealed.  Further, in December of 2007 EPA 
denied California’s petition for a waiver that would allow it (and ultimately other states) 
to move forward with the standards set under AB 1493.  This action is currently being 
appealed by California and a number of other states.  
 
III-3. State Actions Indirectly Affecting GHG Emissions 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 
 At present, 26 states and the District of Columbia have promulgated renewable 
portfolio standards (RPS), which require that some percentage of electricity sold within 
the state come from renewable electricity generating sources.  Most states allow that the 
standard be met through the submission of tradable renewable energy credits (RECs).43  
In some cases where multi-state power pools exist, the Independent System Operator has 
adopted an accounting system that allows interstate trading of RECs.  As is demonstrated 
in Table III-4, RPSs vary across states in their definition of what counts as renewable 
generation – often to coincide with resources that state governments wish to promote or 
develop – as well as stringency and timing. The differing RPS targets also reflect the 
existing “base” of hydro power, which can vary from none to a significant share of 
generation. Thus, their impacts on GHG emissions are expected to vary by state as well, 
depending on the extent to which fossil fuel generation is displaced or avoided.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 See http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/cc_newfs.pdf.   
41 See http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/vehicle_ghg_standard.cfm.   
42 See supra note 18 and the associated discussion in the text.  
43 An REC typically represents 1 MWh of generation from a renewable source, and characteristics such as 
location and emissions (if any).   
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Table III-4. Summary of State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
State Target at Full Implementation 
AZ 15% by 2025 
CA 20% by 2010 
CO 20% by 2020 for large investor-owned utilities, with 4% from solar.  
10% by 2020 for municipal utilities and rural providers. 
CT 27% by 2020 
DC 11% by 2022 
DE 2% solar PV by 2019; 
18% other renewable by 2019 
HI 20% by 2020 
IA 105 MW 
IL 25% by 2025 
MA 4% new renewables by 2009, increasing by 1% annually thereafter. 
MD 2% solar by 2022 
7.5% other  renewable by 2022 
ME 30% by 2000; increase new (post 10/05) renewable capacity by 10% 
by 2017 
MN 25% by 2025; Xcel Energy must produce 30% by 2020 
MO 11% by 2020 
MT 15% by 2015 
NC Public utilities: 12.5% by 2021 
Municipalities and Cooperatives: 10% by 2018 
NH 25% by 2025 
NJ 22.5% by 2021, at least 2% solar 
NM 20% by 2020 
NV 20% by 2015, at least 5% solar 
NY 25% by 2013 
OR 25% by 2025 
PA 18.5% by 2020 
RI 16% by 2020 
TX 5,880 MW by 2015 
VA 12% of 2007 sales by 2022 
VT Equal to the % load growth between 2005 and 2012 
WA 15% by 2020 for major utilities 
WI 10% by 2015 
       Source: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.      
       http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rps.cfm 
 
Energy Sector Demand Reduction Measures 
 
 Many states have implemented measures designed to reduce electricity demand 
and delay investment in new capacity.  Such measures include system benefits charges to 
fund investment in energy efficiency, energy efficiency resource standards, increased 
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building code stringency, and appliance efficiency standards. These programs would be 
expected to reduce electricity and heating fuel demand growth, and thus GHG emissions, 
relative to a counterfactual without such measures.  The range of existing programs found 
in individual states is discussed below. 
 
Energy Efficiency Resource Standards. 
 
Energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) set an energy savings target for a 
state’s electric and sometimes gas utilities, and typically allow for trading and banking of 
energy efficiency gains.  Permissible compliance options may include end-use efficiency, 
supply side efficiency, and the use of combined heat and power.  These standards vary 
across states both in requirements and manner of implementation.  In some states, such as 
Connecticut, EERS are implemented as part of an RPS.  In such a scenario, the EERS 
will provide some level of GHG reductions that are captured within the total quantity of 
GHG reductions achieved by the RPS. Existing EERS standards are summarized in Table 
III-5, below.  
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Table III-5. Summary of State Energy Efficiency Resource Standards 
State Description 
CT  
(Public Act 05-
01, 2005) 
Incorporated into RPS.   Requirement for energy efficiency and CHP 
increases from 1% to 4% of requirement over 2007-2010 
HI  
(Act 95 SLH 
2004) 
Energy efficiency qualifies under state RPS 
IL  
(PA 095-0481, 
2007) 
Increasing electricity savings requirement: 0.2% in 2008 to 2.0% in 
2015 and thereafter.  Dept. of Commerce and Economic Opportunity 
to provide assistance to utilities. 
MN  
(SF 145, 2007) 
Annual savings of electricity and gas equal to 1.5% in retail sales, at 
least 1% of which must be from energy efficiency. 
NC (SB 3, 2007) Included in RPS.  Energy efficiency can be up to 25% of requirement 
through 2018, and 40% thereafter. 
NJ In development. Board of Public Utilities authorized to adopt EERS 
with goals up to 20% savings by 2020. 
NM (HB 305, 
2008) 
Energy-efficiency savings of at least 5% of 2005 sales by 2014, and 
10% of 2005 sales by 2020. 
NY In development. In 2007, Gov. Spitzer called for 15% of total 
forecasted sales by 2015.  
PA (Act 213, 
2004) 
Energy efficiency qualifies as a resource under state Alternative 
Energy Portfolio Standard 
TX  
(HB 3693, 2007) 
Requires utilities to offset 20% of load growth through energy 
efficiency 
VA (HB 3068, 
2007) 
Statutory target of 10% energy savings target for utilities by 2022 
VT (30 VSA § 
209) 
Authorized Public Service Board to establish Efficiency Vermont, a 
state-run energy efficiency utility 
WA (CR 102, 
2006) 
Draft regulation; utility efficiency targets not yet set.  
Source: Pew Center on Global Climate Change and individual state rules. 
 
System Benefits Charges 
  
System benefits charges, also called “public benefit funds” have been 
implemented in roughly half of the states, typically as part of the process of electricity 
deregulation.  Funds are supported by a surcharge on customers’ electric bills, and are 
designated for investment in end-use energy efficiency, renewable energy development, 
or low-income energy assistance.  Some states, such as MN, require a minimum rate of 
investment in energy efficiency.44  It is important to note that, to the extent that a state 
with a system benefits charge has either an RPS that allows energy efficiency as a 
                                                 
44 See MN Statutes 216B.241, online: 
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/getpub.php?pubtype=STAT_CHAP&year=current&chapter=216B#
stat.216B.241.0.  
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resource or a separate energy efficiency resource standard, the system benefit charge will 
not provide additional GHG emission reductions, unless it drives energy efficiency 
resource development in excess of what is required by those standards.   
 
Building Code Upgrades 
 
  State building codes can be modified to increase or establish minimum energy 
efficiency requirements for new residential or commercial buildings.  Many states have 
included updating building codes to increase energy efficiency requirements as part of 
their climate action plans, and a few have moved forward with legislation to adopt such 
measures.  Many states appear to be basing building code updates on the International 
Energy Conservation Code standards, which are updated every three years.45  In addition, 
a number of states have set green building standards requiring new or renovated 
government buildings to obtain LEED certification.46   
 
Appliance Efficiency Standards 
 
States are preempted from establishing efficiency standards for appliances for 
which a federal standard exists under the 1987 National Appliance Energy Conservation 
Act.47 However, states may establish standards for appliances for which a federal 
standard does not exist.  A number of states on the west coast and in the northeast have 
enacted energy efficiency standards for an assortment of appliances such as commercial 
freezers, refrigerators, and ice machines.  California’s standards, for example, currently 
cover energy use from twenty two categories containing appliances not regulated at the 
federal level.48 
 
 
III-4.  Overview of Proposed Federal Cap and Trade Legislation 
 
 While there have been a number of bills proposed in the Senate and House to cap 
national GHG emissions, varying in both cap-levels and coverage, the two most 
prominent bills cover the majority of emissions in the U.S. economy.49  The first is the S. 
1766, the Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007 (hereafter Bingaman-Specter), introduced 
in July 2007.  The second is S. 2191, the American Climate Security Act of 2007 
                                                 
45 See, for example, http://www.massclimateaction.net/Legislation.  
46 LEED stands for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, and is a nationwide benchmark for 
‘high-performance’ green buildings.   
47 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (PL 110-140) updates a number of federal appliance 
efficiency standards and allows the Department of Energy to establish standards that vary regionally for 
heating and air conditioning equipment.  
48 See California Energy Commission, “2007 Appliance Efficiency Standards.”  CEC-400-2007-016-
REV1.  December 29, 2007.  Online: http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-400-2007-
016/CEC-400-2007-016-REV1.PDF.  
49 While a handful of other bills have been introduced, Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman -Warner have 
emerged as the front-running proposals.  It is important to note that some of the other proposed cap-and-
trade bills would cap a smaller portion of emissions from the national economy. For example, the Electric 
Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007 (S. 317, introduced by Senators Feinstein and Carper) would apply only 
to electric generating units.   
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(hereafter Lieberman-Warner), introduced in October 2007, and passed out of the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works in December 2007.  The major provisions 
of these two bills are summarized in Table III-6, below.  Notably, in its current form, 
Lieberman-Warner retains state authority to enact GHG caps and standards that are more 
stringent than the federal cap.50   The most recent version of Bingaman-Specter is silent 
on the treatment of state programs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 See S. 2191, section 9004.  
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Table III-6.  Summary of Major Provisions in the Bingaman-Specter and 
Lieberman-Warner Bills. 
 Bingaman-Specter  
(S. 1766, 110th Congress) 
Lieberman-Warner 
(S. 2191, 110th Congress) 
Cap Declines annually to achieve 2006 
emission levels by 2020; 1990 
levels by 2030.  
Declines annually to 19% below 2005 
levels by 2020; 71% below 2005 levels by 
2030.  Hydrofluorocarbons covered in 
separate cap. 
Applicability Coal-fired power plants (gas and 
oil plants covered upstream), 
petroleum refineries, natural gas 
processing plants, LNG facilities, 
importers of liquid fossil fuels and 
non-CO2 GHGs, and other 
industrial facilities consuming > 
5000 tons of coal. Covers about 
88% of national emissions. 
Coal-fired power plants (gas and oil plants 
covered upstream), petroleum refineries, 
fossil-fuel importers, natural gas 
processing plants, LNG facilities, industrial 
facilities, producers or importers of non-
fuel chemicals. Exempts small business-
owned facilities and facilities or importers 
responsible for emissions < 10,000 tons 
CO2 eq/year.  Covers about 87% of 
national emissions. 
Cost 
containment 
Unlimited banking; safety valve 
(Technology Accelerator 
Payment) set at $12 per ton, 
increasing by 5% above inflation 
annually thereafter. 
Unlimited banking; up to 15% of annual 
compliance obligation can be borrowed 
from the Administrator, and repaid with an 
interest penalty.  Borrowing limit may be 
increased if early allowance prices are 
higher than projections from analysis.   
Offset use No limit on domestic offset use. 
Categories to be determined by 
regulation, but including: landfill 
methane use projects; animal 
waste or municipal wastewater 
methane use projects; SF6 
reductions from transformers; and 
coal mine methane use projects.  
President may allow use of 
international emission allowances 
up to 10% of compliance 
obligation. 
Use limited to 15% of compliance 
obligation per year.  Specific categories of 
offsets to be determined by regulation, but 
include agricultural, forestry, and other 
land-use related projects.  An additional 
15% of compliance obligation can be met 
by international emission allowances.  
Allowance 
allocation 
53% gratis to affected sources, 
generally based on proportional 
share of baseline emissions; 
declines by 2% each year starting 
in 2017.  9% allocated to states.  
12% auctioned, increasing by 1% 
annually starting in 2017.   
40% gratis to affected sources, generally 
based on proportional share of baseline 
emissions, declines by 2% annually 
beginning in 2017; allocations to early 
actors and for CCS; 30.5% to states, load-
serving entities, farms and forests, coal 
mines, others;  26.5% auction beginning in 
2012 (including early auction provision); 
base auction increases by 3% annually to 
69.5% in 2031.  
Source: S. 1766, S. 2191 and Pew Center on Global Climate Change. 
 
The key features to keep in mind for the subsequent discussion of the interaction 
with state or regional programs is that 1) both proposals are comprehensive in including 
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all sources, mobile (through upstream coverage of petroleum refineries) and stationary; 2) 
both employ mixed auctioning and free allocation with the share of the latter declining 
over time, 3) both would allocate some allowances directly to states for auctioning to 
fund specified programs, and 4) Bingaman-Specter contains a safety valve that would 
probably cause it to be less constraining than the projected cap trajectory.   
 
 
IV.  The Impacts of Co-existence of a Federal Cap-and-Trade Program with State 
or Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs 
 
The white paper released by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in 
February 2008 51 addresses the implications of coexisting federal cap-and-trade and state 
or regional emissions programs for total compliance cost and emissions. Its purpose is to 
inform discussion of the appropriate distribution of regulatory authority between the 
federal and state or local governments under federal climate legislation.  The Committee 
staff analysis finds that where a state and federal program coexist, additional reductions 
will be achieved under the state program only where it covers emissions not included 
under the federal cap.  In addition, implications for total costs will depend on whether the 
emissions reductions achieved under the state program would have been achieved under 
the federal cap-and-trade program alone. While we arrive at the same basic results in the 
analysis that follows, we go beyond the analysis presented in the white paper by focusing 
in greater detail on allowance market interactions, distributional impacts, and the role of 
specific design elements.    
 
The nature of the interaction between the federal and state programs will depend 
principally on two factors: the relative stringency of the two programs from the 
perspective of emission sources in the state and the extent of overlap in coverage between 
the federal and state programs.52   In the discussion that follows, simplified, hypothetical 
federal and state or regional53 cap-and-trade programs are presented in order to highlight 
the primary efficiency and distributional consequences of their interaction, beginning 
with a basic case where the coverage of the state and federal programs is identical and 
allowances are distributed entirely through auctions.  This basic case provides a starting 
point for evaluating a reality that is likely to be significantly more complex.  Where state 
and federal cap-and-trade programs co-exist, the interaction between the programs will be 
affected by differences in program coverage and how allowances are distributed, as well 
as some other features of program design. Subsequent sections discuss the effect of these 
variations.   
 
                                                 
51 House Committee on Energy and Commerce staff.  2008.  “Climate Change Legislation Design White 
Paper: Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government.”  February.  Online: 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Climate_Change/index.shtml.    
52 The stringency of an emissions cap is reflected in the level of emissions and the marginal cost of 
abatement or the price of an emission allowance.  The more stringent program – and thus the one that will 
drive behavior at the margin – within the state can be understood as the program that would result in lower 
emissions, and a higher marginal abatement cost and allowance price absent the other program.   
53 To avoid the repetition of ‘state or regional,” all subsequent references to “state” should be understood to 
include multi-state, regional programs unless specifically stated otherwise. 
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IV-1.  Programs with Perfectly Overlapping Coverage 
 
The State Program is More Stringent than the Federal Program 
 
A state cap-and-trade program can be said to be more stringent than the federal 
program if it requires emission reductions from sources within the state beyond what 
those sources would achieve under the federal cap-and-trade program alone. When both 
state and federal programs apply and the state program is more stringent, sources face 
two compliance obligations for the same emissions: obtaining and surrendering both state 
and federal allowances. In this case of a more stringent state program, the prices of both 
the state and federal allowances are influenced by the requirements of the other program.  
For instance, the lower emissions from sources covered by the state program will reduce 
demand in the federal auction and lead to a lower federal allowance price.  At the same 
time, when faced with the requirement of complying with the federal program, in-state 
sources will reduce emissions to the extent justified by the federal allowance price. This 
will reduce demand in the state auction, thereby lowering the state price from what it 
would otherwise have been.  At the end of process, the state and federal allowance prices 
will adjust to levels such that emissions in the state are equal to the state cap and the sum 
of the state and federal allowance prices will be what would have been the initial 
equilibrium price for the state program when considered alone.  Appendix A provides a 
formal demonstration of this result.   
 
A first effect of the interaction of the two programs will be a reduction in auction 
revenues for both programs, which will be proportionately greater for the state auction 
because the state allowance price will always fall more than the federal price. A more 
important effect of the interaction is the resulting discrepancy in the marginal cost of 
abatement between sources within the state and those in other states under the federal 
cap.  From an emissions standpoint, the effect of this discrepancy is to redistribute 
emissions from the state with the binding program to other states. The additional 
emission reduction in the state with the more binding program would be compensated by 
fewer reductions in other states without any reduction of national emissions beyond that 
required by the federal cap. From a cost standpoint, the effect of the state program is to 
impose higher costs on the in-state sources and to reduce the costs for sources in other 
states. Since marginal costs are not equalized among all sources nationally, economic 
efficiency is sacrificed and total compliance costs for achieving the national cap are 
greater than they would be under the national program alone.  
  
 The magnitude of the state program’s impact on the federal allowance price and 
the shifting of emissions and costs would depend not only on the relative stringency of 
the two programs but also on the state’s proportion of national GHG emissions.  For 
example, a binding state cap in Texas, which contributes the largest share of U.S. CO2 
emissions annually, would have a larger impact than a state cap of equivalent stringency 
in Vermont, which contributes the smallest share.  
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The State Program is Less Stringent than the Federal Program 
 
 A less stringent state program would be one that would result in fewer emission 
reductions from in-state sources than the federal program when each is considered alone. 
Or stated differently, the allowance price under the federal program would be sufficiently 
high to induce sources within the state to reduce emissions to a level below the state cap. 
While in-state sources would still be required to comply with both programs, the demand 
for allowances in the state auction would be less than the supply so that in the absence of 
a reservation or minimum price, the additional cost of the state allowance would be zero 
or nearly so.54 The marginal cost borne by in-state sources would be more or less the 
same as those borne by sources in other states and the distribution of emissions among 
states in the federal program would be largely the same as if the state program did not 
exist. Because marginal cost would be equated among all sources subject to the federal 
program, the efficiency loss discussed in the previous scenario is avoided. This 
interaction would limit the impact of the state program to only the imposition of 
additional administrative requirements on in-state sources, namely, bidding for or 
otherwise acquiring the valueless state allowances to meet state compliance requirements, 
and would result in the loss to the state of any anticipated revenue from the state auction.  
Federal auction revenues would be virtually unchanged.  
 
IV-2. Imperfectly Overlapping Programs   
 
When the overlap in coverage between state and federal programs is not identical, 
the interaction between the programs will depend not only on which is the more 
demanding of the sources subject to both, as before, but also on which is the more 
comprehensive in coverage of the state’s emission sources.   
 
If the federal program is the more comprehensive one and it includes all the 
sources included in the state program, the analysis just presented for the case of perfect 
overlap applies. A more stringent state program will lead to higher costs for in-state 
sources subject to the state cap with the resulting redistribution of costs and emissions to 
all other sources in the federal program, including in-state sources not subject to the state 
program. A less demanding state program will have no effect aside from the additional 
administrative cost imposed by the state program.     
 
When the state cap-and-trade program is the more comprehensive one, more 
complications arise in the basic analysis. For sources subject to both state and federal 
programs, the analysis is essentially the same. If the state program is more demanding of 
these sources than the federal program, their costs will be higher and there will be a 
redistribution of cost and emissions to both in-state and out-of-state sources, though in 
this case the effect on each set will differ.  
 
If the more comprehensive state program is less demanding than the federal 
program, sources with overlapping obligations will face a higher price than they would 
                                                 
54 The allowances might still retain some de minimis value if trading would have to occur in order for 
allowances to be reallocated amongst sources for compliance with the state program.   
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under the state program; however, the state program may still have some effect because 
of its broader coverage. The state program may result in emission reductions that are 
additional and the cost incurred by sources with overlapping obligations could be higher 
than that of out-of-state sources subject to the federal program. The reason is that the cost 
of a state allowance may not be zero, as it would be in the case of perfect overlap when 
the state program is the less demanding one.  Appendix B provides a formal 
demonstration of the circumstances under which this result will occur.  Further, it 
demonstrates that where the state program remains binding, the total marginal cost faced 
by sources subject to both the state and federal program will be greater than the marginal 
cost that would have obtained under the state program alone, rather than equal to it as 
occurs under perfectly overlapping programs.    
 
Whether the state allowance price would be zero or not will depend on the 
demand for state allowances from the in-state sources not subject to the federal program. 
If sources with overlapping obligations reduce their demand for state allowances in 
response to the federal allowance price by an amount that accommodates the business-as-
usual emissions for sources subject only to the state program, the state cap will be non-
binding, the state price will be zero, and the state program will have no effect on the 
state’s emissions. However, if that reduction in demand is less such that some emission 
reduction is required of sources subject only to the state program, the state allowance 
price will be positive and that additional cost will drive a wedge between the costs of in-
state sources subject to both programs and out-of-state sources, with consequent 
redistribution of cost and emissions. In this case, the more comprehensive state program 
will cause sources subject only to the state program to reduce emissions in response to 
the still positive state price of allowances. 
 
In all of these cases, in-state sources subject only to the more comprehensive state 
program benefit from the additional requirement imposed on other in-state sources by the 
federal program. Their costs will be less by an amount determined by the extent that the 
federal program reduces the demand for state allowances. So long as the state allowance 
price is not zero, these sources will incur some cost and reduce emissions, although 
always less than would be the case for the state program alone. However, if the reduction 
in demand for state allowances occasioned by the federal program allows these sources’ 
business-as-usual emissions to fit within the state cap, the costs that had been incurred 
under an antecedent state program, or that would be incurred under a prospective state 
program, will disappear.     
 
IV-3. Other Design Features 
 
Freely allocated allowances 
 
Economic theory suggests that the method of distributing emission allowances, 
i.e., through grandfathering or auctioning, will not affect an individual source’s output 
decisions or emissions.55  The primary reason for this is the opportunity cost associated 
                                                 
55 This simple result also requires that certain conditions be met, namely, no transaction costs, perfect 
markets and information, and the absence of cost regulation. While departures from these conditions may 
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with each allowance that is used for compliance. So long as a freely allocated allowance 
can be sold in the market, the use of this allowance to cover emissions implies the 
foregone opportunity of selling the allowance at the market price. Hence a source will 
consider that cost in making abatement decisions. Further, where sources are subject to 
both state and federal caps, the total opportunity cost will be the sum of the individual 
opportunity costs associated with state and federal allowances. The main effect of freely 
allocating allowances instead of auctioning them is to shift the beneficiary of the scarcity 
rent or value created by the cap from the government to the recipients of the freely 
allocated allowances.  Thus, freely allocating allowances will make a significant 
difference to recipients in their net costs of program compliance, but it will not have any 
effect on the interaction of state and federal programs.   
 
For example, when both the federal and state programs freely allocate all 
allowances to the owners of the installations subject to the two programs and the state 
program is more demanding, the overall demand for federal allowances will be less with 
consequent effects on allowance prices and the distribution of costs and emissions, just as 
it would be with auctioning. The only difference is that, with free allocation, sources in 
the state either sell federal allowances to out-of-state sources or purchase fewer 
allowances from them, while, with an auction, in-state sources are not bidding for as 
many allowances in the federal auction. The effects on federal and state allowance prices 
will be the same as in the auctioning case, including the shifting of costs and emissions.  
What were the effects of the overlapping programs on auction revenues are transferred to 
the recipients of the free allocation. The value of each allowance endowment, and the 
opportunity cost associated with each type of allowance, is less than it would be for either 
allowance if the other program did not exist. 
 
The absence of any effect on the state-federal interaction obtains regardless of 
whether one program freely allocates all allowances while the other program auctions all 
allowances, or whether there is a mixed distribution, whereby one or both programs 
freely allocate some allowances and auction the rest. The effect is only to change the 
magnitude of total allowance sales and purchases and the recipient of the implied value, 
depending on which program is freely allocating how many allowances. For instance, if 
the state program freely allocates allowances and the federal program auctions 
allowances, the main difference is that in-state sources would be buying or selling state 
allowances, but the volume and value of transactions would be less than if the state 
program existed alone. Similarly, if the state program auctions allowances and the federal 
program freely allocates them, buying and selling of federal allowances among in-state 
and out-of-state sources would be expected.  
 
Likewise, when the distribution of allowances involves both auctioning and free 
allocation at either state or federal level or both, the interaction between the programs 
will be the same. Most sources will need to resort to the auction or the market to meet 
                                                                                                                                                 
cause emissions and output to be different under free allocation from what would be the case with 
auctioning, opportunity cost will be the dominating difference. The case of cost-regulated electric utilities 
will be specifically discussed later in the text. 
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compliance requirements, but the flow of payments to either or both auctions will be 
reduced by the value of the free allocations.  
 
Finally, if the state program is less stringent than the federal program, the 
allocation method again makes no difference whatsoever for the federal-state interaction. 
State allowances will be worthless and therefore the allocation method is irrelevant. State 
allowances would still be submitted for compliance with the state program, but the 
surplus of state allowances created by the federal program would drive their value to 
zero. In this case, only the federal allowances would impact costs and emissions. Of 
course, the owners of in-state sources would be better off if the federal allowances were 
grandfathered since that would make them, rather than the federal government, the 
recipients of the newly created scarcity rents.  
 
In contrast to the analysis presented above, there is one important exception when 
the impacts under free allocation could vary from those observed under auctions. This is 
when the output prices of sources subject to both programs are not determined by the 
market but instead by a regulatory rate determination based on incurred costs, as is the 
case for electric utilities in many parts of the country. With auctioning, regulatory 
treatment is irrelevant since every ton incurs a cost that will be recovered, in theory, 
either through the market or by appropriate regulatory determination. However, cost-
based price regulation typically does not consider opportunity costs. Consequently, when 
free allocation interacts with conventional electric utility regulation, the only costs that 
are recovered are those actually incurred for abatement or the purchase of allowances less 
any revenue from the sale of allowances. In effect, under free allocation, the scarcity 
value of the allowances is passed on to consumers in lower output prices or electricity 
rates. As a result, abatement will be less to the extent that higher output prices would 
reduce demand. The further result of free allocation in this important exception to the rule 
is that the disparity in marginal cost between in-state and out-of-state sources would be 
less, as would be the redistribution of costs and emissions between in-state and out-of-
state sources.   
 
Safety Valves and Reservation Prices 
 
 These design features serve to limit allowance prices on the up-side and down-
side, respectively. A safety valve places an upper limit on the marginal cost of abatement 
by making additional allowances available once the allowance price reaches some 
predetermined level.  A safety valve in either a state or federal program can be seen as 
providing an upper bound on the price that would be paid or received for allowances 
whether those allowances are auctioned or freely allocated. A reservation price applies 
only for auctions (unless the state or federal government makes a standing offer to 
purchase freely allocated allowances at the reservation price) and it establishes a 
minimum price to be paid for allowances so long as there is a demand for allowances.  
 
The effect of a safety valve depends of course on the frequency with which it is 
triggered. Where the programs overlap perfectly and the state program is more 
demanding, the total cost per ton for sources subject to both programs will not change.  
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Rather, to the extent that the federal safety valve is triggered, the state component of this 
cost will be larger and the value of state allowances will be greater whether they are 
freely allocated or auctioned.56 Similarly, a safety valve in the state program will serve to 
limit the state component of the total cost incurred by in-state sources, and therefore the 
effect on federal allowance value, again to the extent that the state safety valve is 
triggered. Where two programs interact and a safety valve is triggered in one, the effect 
of the other program is expressed in a smaller quantity of the first program’s allowances 
sold at the fixed safety valve price level. If the state program is less demanding than the 
federal program, a state safety valve would be moot since it would never be triggered. 
Finally, the additive cost aspect of overlapping programs will reduce the likelihood that a 
safety valve would be triggered if one were present in either the state or federal program, 
since the interaction of the programs tends to lower each program’s allowance price. 
 
A reservation price will be of greater interest in a state program that auctions its 
allowances.57 With a reservation price, the state program will always produce revenue 
and always impose an emissions cost on in-state sources. Consequently, if the state 
program is less demanding of in-state sources than the federal program and allowances 
are auctioned, a reservation price will ensure some additional abatement by in-state 
sources since it would be a cost additional to the federal allowance price. It will also 
ensure some shifting of costs and emissions with respect to out-of-state sources under the 
federal program since the marginal costs of emissions from in-state sources will always 
be greater than those of out-of-state sources by at least the amount of the reservation 
price. There will also be some effect on the federal allowance price and federal auction 
revenue. When the coverage of the state program is more comprehensive than the federal 
program, a reservation price will also always ensure some additional emission reduction 
on the national level since in-state sources not covered by the federal program would still 
face a price for carbon.    
 
Offset Provisions, Banking and Borrowing 
 
 These common provisions of cap-and-trade programs provide flexibility in 
meeting compliance requirements. Offset provisions allow affected sources to comply by 
submitting approved credits for emission reductions accomplished outside of the cap-and-
trade system. Banking and borrowing provide flexibility over time within the trading 
system. With banking, sources can comply by submitting unused allowances from earlier 
compliance periods and borrowing would allow sources to use allowances issued for 
future periods for compliance in the current period.  
 
These provisions will typically influence federal-state interaction only as they 
affect the stringency of one or the other program. For instance, the presence of relatively 
                                                 
56 A recent report from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) evaluating the Bingaman-Specter bill, 
which contains a safety valve, finds that the safety valve would be triggered for at least some years in all 
the scenarios examined. Energy Market and Economic Impacts of S. 1766, the Low Carbon Economy Act of 
2007, EIA Report SR/OIAF/2007-06 (January 2008). 
57 In response to concerns of over-allocation, RGGI will be incorporating a reservation price of $1.86 per 
ton in the September 2008 auction, adjusted in response to the CPI or market prices thereafter.  See: Point 
Carbon. 2008. RGGI sets auction reserve price of $1.86. March 17.     
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liberal offset provisions in either the federal or state program might make that program 
less stringent than the other with the consequences that have been explained above. 
Banking provisions could have a powerful effect in determining the stringency of a given 
program when initial caps are relatively lax and later caps more demanding. For instance, 
if both state and federal programs have relatively equivalent and undemanding initial 
caps, but the federal program has significantly lower later caps and allows banking, the 
demand for early abatement to generate bankable allowances will cause the federal 
program to be the more stringent in the near term, potentially rendering state allowances 
worthless. A further effect of banking and borrowing provisions will be to stabilize the 
relationship between the two programs since these features tend to establish a floor and a 
ceiling, respectively, on variations in the allowance prices that signal the relative 
stringency of the two programs. 
 
IV-4.  State Retirement of Federal Allowances  
 
The redistributive effects of more demanding state programs co-existing with a 
federal program could be reduced—and even avoided—if state programs also contain 
provisions to retire federal allowances. For instance, if state auction revenues were used 
to purchase and retire federal allowances, out-of-state sources would see less or no 
reduction of costs as a result of the state’s program and federal auction revenues would 
be greater. Because of the retirement of federal allowances, however, the decline in the 
state allowance price would be larger than under the basic case.  In effect, the state would 
be transferring its auction revenue to the federal government. While this transfer would 
not likely be appealing to state governments, the difference in marginal costs between in-
state and out-of-state sources would be reduced by the state purchase and retirement of 
federal allowances, thereby entailing less loss of economic efficiency. While the exercise 
of such an option by states could reduce the distortions associated with a more stringent 
state program, it would also effectively reduce the federal cap thereby raising the 
allowance price and costs to all other states. 
 
An only slightly more appealing alternative for state governments might be to 
retire federal allowances that are proposed to be allocated to the states by both of the 
leading federal proposals. An explicit purchase of federal allowances would be avoided, 
but the state would forego the revenue that could be obtained from the sale of retired 
federal allowances. However, as would also be the case with an outright state purchase of 
federal allowances, the value of federal allowances would be higher to the benefit of the 
federal auction and any other recipients of federal allowances. Moreover, the higher 
federal price will imply an even lower state allowance price and lower state auction 
revenues. The only economic gain from such a course of action would be reducing the 
disparity in marginal cost between in-state and out-of-state sources. 
 
Retirement of federal allowances might also be implemented with free allocation 
but it is not likely to be any more politically appealing. A state regulator could require in-
state sources to purchase and to submit to the state a certain percentage of federal 
allowances in addition to their federal and state surrender requirements. The burden of 
exercising the retirement option would be shifted from the state government to the 
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owners of the in-state sources, which would be likely to mount both political and legal 
challenges to the requirement. The effects on the prices of federal and state allowances 
and on federal and state auction revenues would be the same as if the state government 
were purchasing and retiring the same number of federal allowances.   
 
V.  The Impacts of Coexistence of Federal Cap-and-Trade Program and Other State 
Climate Programs 
 
 Beyond the ongoing development of state cap-and-trade programs, many states 
have implemented, or intend to implement, other more prescriptive forms of regulation 
that either directly or indirectly, impact GHG emissions.  As is the case with state cap-
and-trade programs, the impacts of the coexistence of these programs and a federal cap-
and-trade program will depend on relative program stringency and overlap in coverage.  
We analyze the impacts of coexistence by focusing on the each of the major types of state 
climate action in turn.   
 
V-1. Power Sector Emission Standards 
  
As discussed in Section II, a number of individual states have implemented 
emission standards for greenhouse gases from power plants.  The simplest interaction 
between such programs and a federal cap and trade program occurs with state emission 
standards where all sources covered by the emission standard are covered by the federal 
cap-and-trade program.   If the state’s emission standard requires abatement in excess of 
what the state’s power sector emissions would be under the federal cap alone, the demand 
for federal allowances and their price will be reduced, as would be the case with a more 
demanding state cap-and-trade program.  Because the federal cap will control overall 
nationwide emissions, the addition of an in-state standard will not provide additional 
reductions, but will have implications for the distribution of GHG emissions and costs as 
discussed in the previous section. The marginal abatement cost of sources subject to the 
state’s emission standard will exceed that of out-of-state sources subject to the federal 
cap-and-trade program, and the economic inefficiencies associated with differing 
marginal abatement costs among states will be created.   Conversely, if the state’s 
emission standard does not require sources in the state to reduce emissions beyond the 
level they would achieve under the federal cap alone, the emission standard will have no 
impact on emissions or costs. 
 
 The above scenario becomes more complicated when coverage differs between 
the state emission standard and the cap-and-trade program.  The emission standard, for 
example, might cover some sources that are exempt from the federal cap-and-trade 
program.  If the standard results in emission reductions at these sources, these reductions 
will be additional to those generated by the cap.58 
  
V-2. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
                                                 
58 If the allowance price under the federal cap results in increased utilization of sources exempt from the 
cap but subject to the emissions rate, some of these additional reductions could be offset by emissions 
leakage.   
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For a given national cap level, the presence of a binding renewable portfolio 
standard in a given state will reduce the incremental cost of the federal program for all 
states to the extent that fossil-fuel fired generation is displaced by renewable energy, thus 
reducing the demand for federal allowances, in the same manner as if the state had 
enacted a more demanding state cap-and-trade program.59 Although the cost of the 
federal program would be lower for in-state sources as a result of the state RPS, the 
combined cost of the federal program and the RPS would be greater for in-state sources 
and customers. The incidence would depend on the form of regulation and how the costs 
of the RPS are recovered.60   
 
V-3.  Vehicle Emission Standards 
 
The nature of the interaction between vehicle emissions standards and the cap-
and-trade program depends upon whether motor vehicle fuel is included under the federal 
cap.  Currently, both the Lieberman-Warner and Bingaman-Specter bills include motor 
vehicle fuel through upstream regulation of petroleum refineries.   In these cases, vehicle 
emission standards will have no impact on aggregate GHG emissions, because they are 
determined by the national cap.  Rather, the implementation of a binding state-level 
vehicle emission standards will result in a reduction in transportation sector demand for 
federal allowances as new vehicles enter the fleet, thus lowering the federal allowance 
price relative to the absence of the vehicle standards. Thus emissions will be shifted away 
from the transportation sector toward other sectors, and compliance costs will be shifted 
away from other sectors toward the transportation sector.  The transportation sector will 
face a higher marginal cost of abatement than other sectors and the total cost of 
compliance with the federal cap will increase.61  Finally, if the national cap and trade 
program does not include the transportation sector,62 any emissions reductions generated 
by state vehicle emission standards would be additional.   
 
V-4.  End-use efficiency measures 
 
 Section II discussed a number of policy measures being implemented in the states 
to improve end-use energy efficiency, thus reducing demand growth and the need to 
invest in new generating capacity.  These include updating building energy codes, energy 
efficiency portfolio standards, and system benefits charges for energy efficiency, and 
                                                 
59 We assume that any fossil generation displaced or avoided as a result of the RPS would have been 
subject to the federal cap. 
60 Beyond this effect, the existence of a cap-and-trade program may eliminate the value of ‘green’ attributes 
of RECs because under a cap they can no longer be associated with a reduction in emissions. In order to 
preserve the value of emission reductions held by RECs, some states within RGGI (CT, NH, NY, RI), have 
included provisions to retire allowances equal to estimated emissions reductions associated with voluntary 
REC purchases through state programs.     
61  Despite this potential inefficiency, the Lieberman-Warner bill requires that the Administrator of EPA 
conduct a review of the sector prior to the start of the program in order to determine if additional policies 
are need to reduce GHG emissions from the sector.  See Lieberman-Warner, section 7002.  
62 It is difficult to see, for example, how a cap-and-trade program under the existing Clean Air Act could be 
structured to include the transportation sector.  See Nordhaus, supra note 15.   
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appliance efficiency standards.   Under a comprehensive federal cap-and-trade program, 
these measures will reduce the demand for emission allowances from electricity 
generation and, in the case of building code upgrades, heating fuels, to the extent that the 
actions called for by these measures would not occur in response to the federal cap-and-
trade program.  As a result, allowance prices will be lower than they would be absent 
these programs, resulting in a redistribution of emissions.63  In addition, these programs 
will impact the distribution of abatement costs, transferring the cost of abatement from 
electricity generators and fuel providers to other sectors.  In the case of building codes,  
building developers may face additional materials and construction costs associated with 
meeting the codes, which they may be able to pass on to building purchasers.   Under 
system benefits charges and energy efficiency resource standards, costs will be shifted 
toward electricity consumers and utilities.  In the case of appliance efficiency standards, 
costs will be shifted toward appliance manufacturers, and would likely be passed on to 
consumers.  
 
 In considering the implications of measures that improve energy efficiency, it is 
important to consider whether these measures take advantage of low-cost abatement 
opportunities that would not be achieved because market imperfections and market 
barriers lead consumers not to respond efficiently to the cap-and-trade program’s price 
incentive.64  If these low-cost abatement opportunities would otherwise go untapped 
under the federal cap-and-trade program, such that reductions under the cap come from 
higher-cost abatement opportunities, end-use efficiency measures could actually lower 
the total cost of achieving the national cap.   
 
VI. Preemption or Carve Out of State Cap-and-Trade Programs 
 
 Beyond coexistence, two other potential relationships between state and federal 
cap-and-trade programs can be envisioned: preemption of state cap-and-trade programs, 
or the ‘carve out’ of state programs from the federal program.   These two variations are 
noteworthy because they avoid the circumstance of individual sources paying both a state 
and federal allowance price for each ton of emissions as occurs when state and federal 
cap-and-trade programs overlap.  In addition, the ‘carve out’ scenario has further 
implications for economic efficiency and the distribution of costs.    
  
VI-1.  Federal Preemption   
 
 This paper does not address how pre-emption might be implemented legally. 
While it is easy to imagine that federal legislation might include preemption with respect 
to state or regional cap-and-trade programs, it is less clear how federal preemption would 
operate for non-cap-and-trade climate policies, such as demand-side management and 
                                                 
63 This effect may be tempered somewhat by a rebound effect, which will occur to some degree as 
electricity or heat use becomes less expensive.   
64 See, for example, Jaffe, AJ and RN Stavins. 1994. “The Energy Efficiency Gap: What Does it Mean?” 
Energy Policy 22: 804-810.  They differentiate between market failures and non-market failures in their 
discussion of the ‘energy efficiency gap,’ and suggest that, generally, socially desirable policy intervention 
will target the former.   
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renewable energy requirements, which would interact with a federal cap-and-trade 
program as described in section V.65  The authority to implement such programs has been 
traditionally granted to the states and it is widely exercised by them.  Because most 
discussion of preemption in the context of federal climate policy has focused on state 
cap-and-trade programs, we consider preemption only in that context. 
 
When preemption is exercised with respect to state programs that preceded 
implementation of a federal cap-and-trade program, a transition problem is created.  If the 
federal program does not provide credit for or recognize state program allowances, the 
value of existing state program allowances will fall toward zero to the extent that a bank 
of state allowances has been accumulated.  This price decline could begin to occur well 
before the federal program is finalized as expectations about preemption become 
stronger.  Sources within the state that have banked allowances will be expected to draw 
down their banks as the program as phased out, and statewide emissions will increase.   If 
sources have been unable to bank allowances, allowances through the vintage of the final 
compliance year before preemption will retain value, though allowances from future 
vintages will be valueless.   
 
 When a bank of state allowances exists, a federal program could retain the value 
of existing state allowances and avoid increasing statewide emissions in the short term by 
permitting state allowances to be transferred into the federal program. If the federal 
program allows for the exchange of state allowances for federal allowances at full value 
within the federal cap, there will be no impact on the federal allowance price from 
incorporating state allowances; however, federal allowances in like number would have 
to be subtracted from the auction or free allocations to other sources.  If federal program 
allowances are provided for banked state allowances on top of the cap as early reduction 
credits, the cap is effectively expanded, and the federal allowance price will be lower 
than it would have been absent the exchange of state allowances.   
 
An example of the former approach exists in New Hampshire’s current bill for 
implementing RGGI, which contains provisions that provide for the conversion of banked 
Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) CO2 allowances into RGGI allowances. 66  
This provision provides sources with one RGGI allowance for each banked PSNH 
allowance held, and then subtracts the total allowances awarded from the pool of 
allowances to be auctioned.67  In this case, the value of PSNH allowances going forward 
will be the allowance price under RGGI.   
                                                 
65 In addition, it is unclear that preemption of state programs would be possible if EPA attempts to 
implement a cap on stationary sources under the existing Clean Air Act.   
66 This type of provision occurred in the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme. In the trial 
period extending from 2005 through 2007, member states were given the option of allowing banked trial 
period allowances to be carried over into the subsequent 2008-12 trading period. France and Poland opted 
to allow such banking; however, the European Commission’s guidance for allocation in the second trading 
period required that any banked allowances be taken from the cap. As a result, neither France nor Poland 
chose to honor the banked allowances since it would have required an equal number of allowances to be 
taken from what would otherwise have been allocated to sources. 
67 See New Hampshire House Bill 1434, section 125-O:23.  Online: 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2008/HB1434.html.   
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 Once the preempted state program expires, the allowance price under the federal 
program will drive emission reductions in the state.   Sources will be subject to only a 
federal allowance price, such that the efficiency and redistributive impacts that occur 
under overlapping state and federal programs are avoided.  Finally, the state cap-and-
trade program may continue to affect the pattern of emissions reductions under the 
federal program if the state program led to irreversible investments in abatement that 
would not have occurred under the federal program absent the prior state program.  If the 
state allowance price had been higher than the new federal allowance price, for example, 
investment in energy efficiency or renewable energy may have been greater than it would 
be under the federal program. Because these investments are typically sunk costs and 
tend to be irreversible with near-zero marginal costs, they would remain economical to 
operate under the federal cap.     
 
VI-2.  ‘Carve-Out’ of State Cap-and-Trade Programs 
 
 It is possible, particularly if a federal GHG cap is implemented through a 
regulatory approach under the existing Clean Air Act, that a federal program may allow a 
state to implement its own cap-and-trade program instead of the federal program, 
provided that it is at least as stringent as the federal program.  A federal cap-and-trade 
program under this scenario would resemble the NOx Budget Trading Program or the 
trading program that would have been established under the recently vacated Clean Air 
Mercury Rule. In this situation, sources in a state choosing to implement its own cap-and-
trade program will be subject only to that state cap, while sources in states choosing not 
to implement or retain their own state programs will be subject only to the federal cap.  
Individual state programs will have their own independent allowance prices, which could 
vary widely, and the federal program will have a separate and independent allowance 
price.   
 
 Under this scenario and to the extent that the carved-out state programs can 
hermetically seal themselves off from the federal program, the inability of sources in 
different states to equate marginal abatement costs will result in a loss of economic 
efficiency.  Total emissions will be lower than the original national cap to the extent that 
states require reductions additional to what would occur under the federal program.  In 
any case, total national costs would be higher than if there were only a federal program.  
 
The economic rationale for states independently implementing a cap-and-trade 
program when a federal program is available is unclear. States with relatively high 
abatement costs should have a strong incentive to join the federal program in order to 
lower compliance costs for its sources.  States with relatively low abatement costs may be 
able to benefit by being net sellers of allowances or improving their competitive 
positions.  In addition, a federal program, with thousands of sources under the cap and a 
wide distribution of abatement costs should provide a larger, more liquid allowance 
market and less price volatility than could be achieved in an individual state program.   
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Also, deciding the criterion for an approvable state ‘carve-out’ would be difficult 
if the federal cap has not been divided into state GHG ‘budgets’ as occurred in the 
context of the NOx Budget Trading Program.  For instance, the most obvious criterion, a 
specified percentage reduction of emissions from some base year, will impact states 
differently according the distribution of abatement costs among the states and changes in 
industrial structure that would affect emissions.  In particular, a real potential for adverse 
selection exists. States with relatively abundant low cost abatement potential or emissions 
that are declining for other reasons would have a perverse incentive to set up their own 
programs thereby leaving states with relatively fewer abatement opportunities or rising 
emissions in a higher cost federal program. Although other criteria could be imagined, 
the distribution of abatement costs is only imperfectly known, as are other trends that 
affect emissions, such as migration or changes in industrial structure.     
 
 A scenario can be imagined where linkage is established by mutual recognition 
between ‘carved out’ state cap-and-trade programs and the federal program, permitting 
the trade of federal and state allowances. With such linkage, sources in states with higher 
state allowance prices would purchase federal allowances for compliance with the state 
program thereby increasing costs in other states but also equalizing marginal costs across 
all states. In this case, allowing state program carve-outs with linkage achieves both 
lower national emissions and economic efficiency through the common national 
allowance price.   
 
 This result presents an interesting contrast to what occurs with overlap or co-
existence between a more stringent state cap and the federal program.  In the overlap 
case, the individual state bears the cost of its more aggressive emissions reductions, 
lowering the cost of the national program for sources in other states, while sources within 
the state experience a marginal cost per ton comprised of the state and federal allowance 
price.  In the separate-but-linked case, however, the state can distribute the cost of its 
more aggressive reductions among all states in the federal program, raising the federal 
allowance price for all sources, and eliminating the loss in economic efficiency attendant 
on differing marginal costs. In effect, in-state sources would be paying cheaper out-of-
state sources to effect part of the state’s extra emissions reduction on their behalf. The 
beneficiaries would be the initial holders of the federal allowances, either the federal 
auction or grandfathered recipients. State allowances would be equal in value to federal 
allowances and that state value would be intermediate between what it would be if the 
state program existed alone and what it would be with co-existing or overlapping state 
and federal programs.   
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
While the vast range of state and regional policies to reduce GHG emissions 
suggests a potential multitude of interactions between any federal climate policy and state 
and regional programs, these interactions are largely determined by two factors: the 
extent to which the state and federal programs cover the same sources and the relative 
stringency of the federal and state programs in question.  An understanding of these 
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potential interactions is essential to state and federal policymakers as both move forward 
with climate policy design.     
 
 The basic rule is that to the extent that a state or regional program is duplicative of 
the federal program, the effect is either solely redistributive of emissions and costs or 
nugatory, depending on whether the state program is more or less demanding of in-state 
sources than the federal program. It may be argued that a state program could have the 
additional effect of lowering the cost of the federal program if it addresses a market 
failure that impedes low or negative cost reductions, but this is a hard test for policy to 
meet.  Also, to the extent that the state program affects sources not covered by the federal 
program, the effect on cost and emissions will usually be additional. 
 
 While affected sources in other states might welcome the cost reductions that 
result from more demanding action in some given state, such differentiation does impose 
a loss of economic efficiency and therefore an additional cost nationwide. While 
additional costs may be justified for pollutants where the sources and damages are local, 
this is not the case for greenhouse gases. Therefore, to the extent that economic efficiency 
is a goal—and it can be argued that for a problem as complex and difficult as climate 
change achieving goals at least cost is very important—federal preemption of duplicative 
state cap-and-trade programs is warranted. It can also be argued that the inefficiencies are 
not large, that other non-economic considerations are as important, and that the existing 
precedents of retained state authority in most areas of emissions control are more 
compelling. 
 
 Beyond federal preemption, the only way to avoid the redistribution and 
inefficiency associated with a more demanding state program would be a carve-out of the 
state program with linkage to the default federal system. Such an arrangement would 
ensure additional emission reductions and a nationwide distribution of the additional cost 
that would achieve least cost attainment of the tighter cap.  The catch for the state 
choosing to implement a more stringent cap, and thereby to auction or to freely allocate 
fewer allowances, is that auction revenue or allowance value will be less for the state or 
its in-state sources. While incurring somewhat higher costs, other states would also be 
beneficiaries as sources within the state purchase allowances from out-of-state auctions 
or allowance holders to avoid what would otherwise be the even higher costs of the more 
demanding state program that justified the carve-out.  Such a provision also transfers 
control of the national cap level from the federal government to the states, and could 
create significant uncertainty as to the final cap, depending on the extent to which states 
exercise this option. 
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Appendix A 
 
The effect of overlapping state and federal climate programs 
 
 
Definitions and notation 
 
The marginal abatement cost (MAC) function for the set of installations included in a 
cap-and-trade program can be written as: 
 
A.1) iiiii mcep =−= βα  
 
Where subscript i denotes the program, in this case, either s or f for state or federal, 
respectively. The symbol p represents the price of allowances; mc, the marginal 
abatement cost incurred by installations subject to the program; and e, the aggregate 
emission level. The coefficients in the marginal abatement cost function, α and β,  
indicate, respectively, marginal abatement cost when all emissions have been abated (ei = 
0) and the rate at which marginal abatement cost rises as emissions are abated.  
 
For ease of presentation in what follows, let αi = α, that is, the cost of the last possible 
and most expensive increment of abatement is the same for both the federal and state 
programs. Then, if the federal program includes all installations in a given state program, 
it follows that: 
 
A.2) sffs andee ββ <<  
 
Two emission levels are particularly important in any cap-and-trade program, the capped 
level of aggregate emissions, denoted by a bar, ie , and counterfactual or business-as-
usual level of emissions, denoted by superscript 0, 0ie . Since marginal abatement cost and 
the allowance price would be zero at the BAU emission level, and by the definition of a 
binding cap, it follows from equation 1) that 
 
A.3) 0, 00 ><= iii
i
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α  
 
where ip denotes the allowance price when ei ee = . Finally, the level of state emissions 
that would obtain under the federal program, when it is considered independently of any 
state program, is denoted by a tilde. 
A.4) 0~ sf
s
f
s
f
s ee
p
e <=−= β
β
β
α
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Equation A.4) effectively states that the state’s emissions will be a share of the federal 
cap that is determined by the slope of the state’s marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve 
relative to that of the country as a whole.  
 
Finally, all the variables indicated above may be different when state and federal 
programs overlap. Such variables will be denoted by a prime so that, for instance, sp′ , 
would indicate the state allowance price when both state and federal programs exist. 
Figure A.1) illustrates these relationships for the case of a more demanding state 
program; and it will be helpful in understanding the discussion of state and federal 
program interaction that follows. 
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Figure A.1.  Marginal abatement cost curve shifts and implications for emissions and allowance prices 
under overlapping federal and state cap-and-trade programs. 
 
Overlapping effects 
 
State and federal cap-and-trade programs can be said to be overlapping when the owners 
of affected facilities must comply with both programs for the same emissions. For any 
level of emissions at affected facilities, owners would surrender federal allowances for 
compliance with the federal cap-and-trade program and state allowances for the state 
program. In effect, they would be paying twice for the emissions. Accordingly, the 
marginal cost paid by in-state sources would be: 
 
A.5) fss ppmc ′+′=  
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A first question to be addressed concerns the relationship of this marginal cost, which is 
the sum of two allowance prices, to the marginal cost that would be faced by in-state 
sources if either the state or federal programs existed alone. To address this question, it is 
necessary first to determine the effect of the state program. This can be expressed as the 
difference between the state cap and what in-state emissions would be under the federal 
program, when both exist alone. Using equation A.4), this difference can be expressed as: 
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The relationship within parentheses compares two shares. The first ratio within 
parentheses expresses the share of the state cap in the federal cap when both exist. The 
second share is the one just noted: the state’s emissions under a stand-alone federal 
program. If the state program would allow more in-state emissions than would occur 
under the federal program alone, then the expression in parentheses and equation A.6) 
take a positive value and the state program can be said to be less demanding of in-state 
sources than the federal program. In this case, the state program imposes no additional 
requirement on in-state sources and the state constraint is slack. Accordingly, state 
allowances will have no value ( 0=′sp ) so that the marginal cost faced by in-state 
sources will be determined by the federal program alone. Using equation A.5),  
 
A.7)  ffsfs ppppmc =+=′+′= 0  
 
Conversely, if ss ee ~<  and the value of the expression in parentheses and of equation A.6) 
is negative, the state program is more demanding than the federal program and the 
marginal cost faced by in-state sources could be expected to be higher than it would be 
under the federal program. However, the federal price would not be as high as it would be 
without the state program or with a less binding state program, since the additional in-
state reduction required by the more stringent state cap would reduce the demand for 
federal allowances from in-state sources. This change in the demand for federal 
allowances will shift the federal MAC inward by the amount of the difference stated in 
equation A.6) and reduce the price of federal allowances for both in-state and out-of-state 
sources. The shift in demand for federal allowances will have the effect of reducing the 
vertical intercept, α, by sf eΔβ  so that the new federal price will be:  
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In interpreting equation A.8), it is important to remember that when 0≥Δ se , or the state 
constraint is slack, there is no effect on the demand for federal allowances or the price of 
federal allowances. Therefore,  
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When state and federal programs overlap, the interaction extends also from the federal 
program to the price of state allowances. The demand for state allowances will also be 
less because in-state sources would take into account the cost of complying with the 
federal program  that is, fp′ ,the federal price resulting from the overlapping programs. In 
the same manner as the federal MAC is shifted by the additional reductions required by 
the state program, so the state MAC is shifted inward by the difference, 0~ ss ee −′ , the 
extent to which in-state emissions are reduced in response to the federal allowance price.  
Accordingly, the adjusted state allowance price can be expressed as: 
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Equation A.10) demonstrates that the adjusted state allowance price will be the difference 
between what the state allowance price would be with a stand-alone state program and 
the federal price after consideration of the effect of the more demanding state program. 
Thus, for the case of a more demanding state program, the marginal cost paid by in-state 
agents will be: 
  
A.11) sfs pppmc =′+′=  
 
Summarizing, the marginal cost paid by in-state sources will be the higher of the stand-
alone allowance price for the state or federal program depending on which demands more 
of sources within the state. 
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When the programs overlap and the state program is more demanding than the federal 
program, the interaction of the two programs reduces the demand for and value of 
allowances from each program. Keeping in mind that seΔ is negative in the case of a 
more demanding state program, it can be easily shown that the effect of the interaction 
between state and federal programs is greater on the state price than on the federal price. 
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Consequently, the effect on allowance value (and on auction revenue) will be 
proportionately greater for the state allowances than for the federal allowances. 
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Appendix B 
 
The effect of overlapping state and federal programs when the state program 
is more comprehensive 
 
 
 
When the state cap-and-trade program is more comprehensive than the federal program, 
there is an interesting divergence from the rule that the combined compliance cost of the 
federal and state programs would equal the stand-alone state allowance price. In fact, 
there are two important differences from what is observed in the case of perfectly 
overlapping state and federal systems. The first difference is that the state allowance price 
may not be zero even though the state program is less demanding of the in-state sources 
covered by both programs than the federal program. Thus, a less demanding but more 
comprehensive state program may trigger the allocative inefficiencies that are observed 
in perfectly overlapping programs only when the state program is more demanding than 
the federal program. The second difference is that the state allowance price, after taking 
the interaction with the federal program into account, can be higher than the stand-alone 
state price. The cause of these differences is the demand from the in-state sources that are 
not covered by the federal program. The mathematical explanation follows. 
 
The Stand-alone Federal Program 
 
In the case of a more comprehensive state program, the federal program affects sources 
located in one sector only, perhaps electricity generators. In subsequent notation, this 
sector will be denoted by subscript s1 or f1 for the in-state sources and all federal sources, 
respectively. The federal price and the resulting level of in-state emissions from covered 
sources are given by equations B.1) and B.2), respectively.  
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As in the case of perfect overlap, the level of emissions for in-state sources is a sub-set of 
the federal cap that is determined by the slopes of the federal and state MACs for the 
affected sources. 
 
The Stand-alone State Program 
 
In-state sources that are covered by the state program but not the federal program are 
denoted by subscript s2 and the emissions covered by the state program are denoted by 
subscript s so that 
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Alternatively, 
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The equations corresponding to B.1) and B.2) above for the federal program are given 
below with the emissions level in the two sectors denoted by a dot over the symbol. 
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Note that using equation B.4), s
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Determining the Conditions for a Slack State Program 
 
As noted in the case of perfectly overlapping programs, interaction with the federal 
program can cause the state allowance price to fall to zero and to render the state program 
completely without effect. However, when the state program is more comprehensive that 
the federal program, it is not enough for the federal program to reduce emissions in the 
sector with overlapping requirements beyond what they would be without the federal 
program. It must reduce emissions even more to the point that eliminates any requirement 
for sources in the sector without federal obligations to reduce emissions at all. Thus, the 
state program will become slack if the federal program causes sector 1’s emissions to be 
low enough that the state cap is met without any effort from sources in sector 2. The 
condition for a zero state allowance price can be stated as 
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Algebraic manipulation of equation 7) using the previous equations will yield the 
condition for a zero state price. 
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Using the prime notation to designate allowance prices when programs interact, the 
conditions for a positive state allowance price can be stated as. 
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The notable difference from the case with complete overlap is that a positive state price 
may still obtain when the stand-alone state price is lower than the stand-alone federal 
price. The mathematical reason is that the fraction formed by the slopes of the MACs for 
the state program as a whole and for the sector with overlapping federal requirements will 
always take a value less than unity. Obviously, the larger is sector 1 and the more closely 
the value of βs1 approaches that of βs , the closer the zero state price condition approaches 
what obtains in the case of perfectly overlapping federal and state programs.  
 
Effect of the Federal Program on the State Program 
 
We assume always that the federal price will be positive and for the time being we ignore 
any state program effects on the federal program. Thus, the marginal costs facing sources 
in the two state sectors are: 
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The introduction of the exogenous federal price will have the effect of shifting the state 
MAC by an amount equal to 011~ ss ee −  so that the new state MAC curve will be 
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With equation B.11), the redistribution of emissions between the two sectors of the state 
program can be identified. 
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Further manipulation of these results using equation 4) produces 
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These equations simply state that the change of emissions between sectors in the state 
program will be equal and offsetting as would be required by the cap on state emissions. 
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Effect of the State Program on the Federal Program 
 
It is now time to relax the assumption that the federal allowance price is invariant. If the 
conditions stated in equation 8) are such that the adjusted state allowance price, sp′  , is 
positive, then the emissions in sector 1 will be lower than they would be under the federal 
program alone. The magnitude of this difference will be 011 <−′ ss ee && . Accordingly, using 
equation B.14),  
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Note that the federal allowance price is no longer fixed but dependent on the interaction 
as it would be in any final equilibrium. Gathering 1fp′ on the left-hand side of equation 
B.15) and rearranging, the following is obtained. 
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As would be expected and so long as there is a positive state allowance price, the 
adjusted federal allowance price will always be less than the stand-alone federal price, as 
determined by the slopes of the three inter-acting MACs. 
 
Restating the State Effects with the Adjusted Federal Price 
 
When the federal price is no longer invariant, the results previously obtain for the effects 
of a federal program on the state program can be restated to reflect the interaction. Thus, 
equation B.10) becomes [using equation B.4) in substituting for βs] 
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The emissions in the two sectors of the state program become 
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The only difference here is that the shift of emissions from sector 1 to sector 2 is a little 
smaller in magnitude due to the interaction with the federal MAC curve and the 
consequent lower federal price. 
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Finally, the marginal cost faced by sources in the two state sectors as stated in equation 
B.9) become using equations B.16) and B.17) 
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Thus, the second difference from the case of perfect overlap is obtained. The post-
interaction price for the sources facing both state and federal obligations will be higher 
than the stand-alone state price if the state program is more comprehensive and the 
federal program does not make it slack. 
 
It should be noted in explaining this result that the difference between the marginal costs 
in the two sectors is equal to the adjusted federal price. 
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This result is similar to what obtains in the perfectly overlapping case in that the adjusted 
federal price defines the difference in marginal cost between the two sectors in the state 
program. What is different from the case of perfect overlap is that the continuing demand 
from the in-state sources not subject to the federal program must be taken into account 
and that accommodation causes the cost faced by the in-state sources with dual 
obligations to be higher than that cost would be without the federal program. This also 
means that the disparity in marginal cost is greater between sources in sector 1 and those 
in sector 2 than it is between those in sector 1 and similar out-of-state sources in the 
federal program.  
 
